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Protection Coordination Based on Multi-agent 
for Distribution Power System 
with Distribution Generation Units 
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1Abstract--The penetration of DGs would drastically affect the 
traditional distribution power system fault current level and the 
characteristics of fault currents, consequently, the traditional 
protection arrangements developed in radial systems are difficult 
in coordination, and also the reclosing scheme would be affected. 
With the rapid developments in distribution system automation 
and communication technology, the protection coordination and 
reclosing scheme based on information exchange for distribution 
power system can be realized flexibly. A protection coordination 
mode based on multi-agent technology is discussed in this paper. 
 
Index Terms--Distribution power system, Distributed 
Generation Units, Protection Coordination, Multi-agent 
technology 
I INTRODUCTION 
The traditional power systems, which are based on large 
fossil fuel fired power generation plants, long distance 
transmission lines and hierarchical control centres, are 
changing. A large number of dispersed generation (DG) units, 
including renewable energy sources such as wind turbines, PV 
generators, fuel cells together with Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP) plants, are being integrated into power systems at 
distribution level. For example, the decentralised power plants, 
including wind turbines, cover up about 40% of the total 
production capacity in Danish power systems. The use of DG 
units, especially renewable energy source based DGs, are 
driven by the growing concern over the environmental 
pollution and the increased internationalisation and 
liberalization of the electricity market. The use of renewable 
sources is promoted to meet environmental goals and provide 
long-term energy supplies. The liberalization of the electricity 
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market provides the opportunity for investors to install various 
types of renewable energy based DG units. The energy, being 
produced locally near the load, can also reduce the losses from 
the power transmission and distribution. On the other hand, the 
large number of the renewable based DG integrated into the 
power market also presents a great number of challenges. The 
introduction of renewable energy based DG units affects the 
network economically and technically in a number of ways. 
The power electronic converters, which are used for interfacing 
most of renewable generation units, fuel cells and energy 
storage devices, may present very different characteristics from 
the conventional generation units, including load frequency 
control, voltage regulation and system level automatic 
generation control; The DG units connected to the distribution 
network could present a complicated pattern of load flow, 
which will affect the utilization levels and power losses, and 
they could also alter the fault level.  The power electronic 
interfaces may introduce different transient and dynamic 
behaviours, therefore it is expected the distribution system with 
large number of renewable energy based DG units will present 
very different dynamic characteristics in comparison with the 
conventional systems. As the number of renewable energy 
based DG units increases, the aforementioned impacts would 
become more serious, and have the possibility of limiting the 
capacity of accepting the integration of the renewable energy 
based DG units. Therefore, it is critical to assess the impacts of 
the DG installation on power systems so that good quality and 
secured power supply can be provided. One of the most 
important issues is the protecting relay systems.  
The penetration of DGs changes the traditional 
distribution power system short circuit power, fault current 
level and the characteristics of the fault current, such as 
amplitude, direction, distribution. So protection systems 
developed for radial systems are facing great challenge. Also 
the reclosing schemes of power systems will be affected. The 
coordination of relays needs to be reconsidered, and the 
coordination between the reclosing strategy and the 
anti-islanding action should be taken into account as well.  
This paper is focused on the protection coordination. 
Coordination is a basic requirement for operation of protective 
relays, active research has taken place in this area. The 
influence of the distributed generation on the directional relays 
based on the symmetrical components of the currents was 
discussed in [1]; the distance relay algorithm was discussed in 
detail in [2]; and the coordination of overcurrent protection for 
ring-fed distribution network with distributed generators was 
investigated in [3]; the coordination between recloser and fuse 
was discussed and a method to choose recloser curves to 
achieve coordination was proposed in [4]. Single phase 
grounding faults were simulated, and the results indicate that 
the grounding faults caused by distributed generators could be 
dealt with by using rapid anti-islanding protection in [5]. 
The distribution power system automation techniques 
have been widely adopted and the infrastructure of 
communication has been developed. The protections based on 
microprocessors with communication capabilities are utilized, 
so that the status of the relays and breakers can be obtained 
from the distribution power system supervisory control and 
data acquisition system, which can serve as an information 
exchange platform. Based on the platform, the protection 
coordination and adaptation can be dealt with flexibly. 
The protection system based on the Multi-agent 
technology has been proposed. An agent-based current 
differential relay using a communication network was 
investigated in [6]; an agent-based paradigm for self-healing 
protection systems was proposed in [7]; and a decentralized 
multi-agent based protection with capability of detecting high 
impedance fault and fault location, and shedding load for the 
DGs systems was discussed in [8]. 
A protection coordination based on multi-agent 
technology for distribution systems with DG units is discussed 
in this paper. 
II EFFECTS OF DGS ON POWER SYSTEM FAULTS 
Different types of DGs may present different fault 
characteristics. If power electronic converters are used as the 
interface for DGs, due to the fast switching and control 
nature of power electronic converters, the short circuit 
currents and transients from the converter system may be 
distinctly restrained. Also, automatically reclosing device 
may fail: since the fault may not be cleared because the fault 
may be fed from DGs. In case that the islanding operation 
happens, the voltage and frequency may be varying due to 
power unbalance, so that a reclosing without synchronization 
could wrongly connect two systems which may not meet the 
synchronization condition, consequently, cause system 
dynamic problems. Extended delay time may have to be 
adopted between the separation of the DG units and the 
reconnection of the utility supply to make sure fault clearing 
possible. The total reclosing delay time may be prolonged to 
1 second or so.  
When DGs are connected into the distribution power 
grid, the grounding strategy should be taken into account. 
There are various grounding methods: solid grounding or 
impedance grounding (including small resistance grounding 
and reactor grounding), or no grounding. In [9], 
interconnection of distributed generators to power systems 
was discussed in detail. From the view of protection, a 
different grounding strategy will result in different fault 
current distribution, and then the sensitivity of the protection 
devices could be affected. 
III PROTECTION ARRANGEMENT BASED ON MULTI-AGENT 
Structure of protection agent 
The radial topology is still mostly adopted in many 
distribution power systems. Because of DGs introduction, the 
system operation and fault response could be changed as 
discussed above. The traditional time overcurrent protection 
arrangement may not satisfy the new situation. But the 
protection arrangement may be improved by taking the 
advantage of the aforementioned information exchange 
platform, which can be based on the data platform of the 
distribution power system automation. The whole protection 
agent system may take the format as illustrated in Fig. 1. The 
whole protection management system may be classified into 
two layers: the substation layer and the protection (Intelligent 
Electronic Devices) IED layer. 
 
Fig. 1 Structure of protection agent 
The substation layer is the kernel of the whole agent 
system. The functions of the substation layer are described as 
follows: 
1) obtain the power system status by a SCADA system, 
and process the information from the control nodes, which are 
located on some distribution busbars and can be classified into 
three types: Normal nodes; Interconnection nodes; PCC 
nodes; 
2) to establish protection strategies; 
3) to create logic for inter-locking and inter-tripping; 
4) to create strategy for protection backup; 
The protection IED layer is the second subsystem, which 
form the detailed protection and control logics to deal with 
each individual fault. 
Communication 
The communication is the basis to realize the protection 
agent system. There are various communication structures, 
such as synchronous digital hierarchy network (SDH), 
microwave etc. But the field bus interfaces (for instance CAN 
bus [10]) is a popular and cheap communication method for 
microprocessor based relays. The Elec-Optic can be adopted 
to convert the electrical signal to optical signal, and then the 
digital signals are transmitted through optical fibres 
(wavelength 1.31um or 1.55um). 
A CAN message data frame is composed of 7 different 
bit fields: start of frame, arbitration filed, control field, data 
field, CRC field, ACK field, end of frame. The maximal 
length of data field is 8 bytes. The standard data frame is up to 
109 bits long. The bit rate is up to 1Mbit/sec. 
If the transmission speed is 19200bit/s, the whole 
standard data frame can be transmitted in 5.7ms, and it takes 
no more than 5ms in the transmission channel. So the time 
should be less than 11ms. In general, the calculation time of 
relay is no more than 30ms. 
IV CASE STUDY 
A simplified radial distribution power grid is shown in 
Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2 A simplified grid structure 
Case 1 reported in the paper is a single-phase grounding fault 
occurred at 0.5s of simulation time at point A with 10ohms 
grounding resistance. The DGs, having capacity of 150kW 
each, are based on power electronics interfaces and connected 
into the grid by Y/delta transformers. Each supplies 95% of its 
local load. 
The setting of the over-current relay is 200% of the 
overload current. When the single phase fault happens at A, 
both relay A1 and A2 will start up by the overcurrent and the 
downstream power direction. Then the relay A1 and A2 send 
the message including direction and overcurrent indications. If 
the relay A1 and relay A2 both indicate the overcurrent and 
downstream direction, then relay A2 may call the downstream 
relay A3 for the information of current, voltage and direction 
indications at Relay A3. The logic of relay A2 is shown in 
Fig.3. 
 
Fig. 3 The logic of relay A2 (prohibiting DG islanding 
operation) 
(OC: overcurrent; LV: low voltage) 
(dir: power direction, downstream = True, upstream = False) 
For the case of prohibiting DG islanding operation, the 
possible operation steps are as follows: 
1) The relay A2 is tripped out, and the DG1 is also 
tripped out by sending the remote trip signal. Therefore 
islanding operation is not permitted in this case, 
2) The relay A2 recloses, if the reclosing succeeds, then 
relay A2 sends indication to reconnect the DG1. 
3) Otherwise, it indicates that a permanent fault between 
A2 and A3, the relay A3 will be tripped out, and the fault is 
isolated, then the interconnection breaker L1 is closed, and the 
DG1 may be reconnected to restore power supply. 
Some simulation results are shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Currents at relays A1 
 
Currents at relays A2 
 
Currents at relays A3 
 
Fig. 4 Simulation results (prohibiting DG islanding operation) , 
currents at relays A1, A2 and A3 downwards 
 
Case 2 is a single phase grounding fault occurred at 0.5 s of 
simulation time at point A with 10ohms grounding resistance. 
The DGs, having capacity of 150kW each, are based on 
synchronized generators and connected into the grid by 
Y/delta transformers. Each supplies 95% of its local load. In 
this case, the permitting DG islanding operation and reclosing 
are taken into account. 
 
Fig. 5 The logic of relay A2 (permitting DG islanding 
operation) 
The relay operation steps are as follows: 
1) The relays A2 and A3 are tripped out, while the DG1 
stay in network to supply some its local load in islanding 
operation mode.  
2) The relay A2 recloses, if the reclosing succeeds, then 
relay A2 sends indication to reconnect the A3. 
3) Otherwise, it indicates that a permanent fault between 
A2 and A3, the DG1 may keep the islanding operation mode 
until the fault is cleared or it may be connected the network 
through the interconnection breaker L1. 
Some simulation results are shown in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6 Simulation results (permitting DG islanding 
operation), currents at relays A1, A2 and A3 downwards 
Fig. 7 Reclosing the interconnection breaker L1 without 
synchronization 
In fig. 6, it is shown that the DGs based on synchronized 
generators have more notable impact on the faults than that 
based on electronic converter interface (in fig .4) because of 
the characteristics of the electronic converter control strategy. 
And in fig.7, it is shown that the reclosing without 
synchronization device results in reclosing power swing. 
Therefore, in order to realise the islanding operation, more 
devices may be required, such as synchronization device may 
need to be installed at the selected possible busbars and the 
DGs should have the fast regulation ability to avoid the 
reclosing overshooting and the power swing of the DGs. 
V CONCLUSION 
When DGs are connected into the distribution power 
system, the coordination of the protection will become 
complicated. In this paper, a protection arrangement based on 
multi-agent is discussed. The proposed method takes the 
advantage of the information platform of distribution power 
automation systems. It has better performance than the 
traditional protection arrangement, such as protection 
coordination and fault location, but when the communication 
fails it may degrade to transitional time-overcurrent protection 
scheme. 
VI REFERENCES 
[1] Petit M,  Le Pivert X, Bastard P. Gal I., “symmetrical components to 
suppress voltage sensors in directional relays for distribution networks: effect 
of distributed generation”, Developments in Power System Protection, 2004. 
Eighth IEE International Conference, Vol.2, pp. 575 – 578, 5-8 April 2004 
[2] .Chilvers, N. Jenkins and P. Crossley, “Distance relaying of 11kV circuits 
to increase the installed capacity of distributed generation”, Generation, 
Transmission and Distribution, IEE Proceedings, pp. 40 – 46, Jan 2005 
[3] So, C.W., Li, K.K., “protection relay coordination on ring-fed distribution 
network with distributed generations”, TENCON '02. Proceedings, vol.3, pp. 
1885 – 1888, 28-31 Oct. 2002 
[4] Brahma. S.M., Girgis. A.A., “Microprocessor-Based Reclosing to 
Coordinate Fuse and Recloser in a System with High Penetration of 
Distributed Generation”, Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting, 2002. 
IEEE, pp. 453 – 458, Jan. 2002 
[5] L.K.Kumpulainen, K.T.Kauhaniemi, “aspects of the effects of distributed 
generation in single-line-to-earth faults”, Future power system 2005, pp. 1-5 
Nov. 2005 
[6] Coury. D.V., Thorp. J.S., Hopkinson. K.M., Birman. K.P., “An 
agent-based current differential relay for use with a utility intranet”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivety, Vol. 17, pp.47-53, Jan.2002 
[7] Su Sheng, Li K.K., Chan. W.L., Zeng Xiangjun, Duan Xianzhong,, 
“Agent-Based Self-Healing Protection System”, IEEE Transactions on Power 
Delivety, Vol. 21, pp. 610 - 618, April 2006 
[8] Zeng Xiangjun, Li K.K., Chan. W.L., Su Sheng, “Multi-Agents Based 
Protection for Distributed Generation Systems”, Electric Utility Deregulation, 
Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2004, pp. 393 - 397, April 2004 
[9] Nagpal. M., Plumptre. F., Fulton. R., Martinich. T.G., “Dispersed 
generation interconnection-utility perspective” IEEE Transactions on Industry 
Applications, Vol. 42 pp. 864 - 872, May-June 2006 
[10] CAN specification, version 2.0, Robert Bosch Gmbh, Stuttgart, 1991 
 
 
